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Deferred-Interest Credit for What Ails You: 
A Proposal for Regulation of Healthcare 
Providers Under the Pennsylvania Credit 
Services Act 
Jacob Wonn* 
ABSTRACT 
 
In self-pay healthcare markets—such as dentistry, fertility care, and 
cosmetic surgery—patients commonly finance their treatment on credit. 
For this reason, many providers in these markets have partnered with third-
party medical creditors to offer their patients financing options. These 
medical creditors appeal to patients through deferred-interest financing 
plans that allow borrowers to avoid owing interest if they pay off their full 
balance within a given time period; however, patients who fail to do so are 
charged exorbitant interest rates. 
Unfortunately, patients frequently enter into these credit agreements 
without an accurate understanding of the terms and conditions, and 
providers are not currently required to make any efforts to assist patients 
in this respect. While the vast majority of these providers are likely acting 
in good faith, their promotion of medical credit products may nonetheless 
influence patients to make suboptimal borrowing decisions. In this way, 
providers may inadvertently contribute to patient financial distress and 
erode trust in provider-patient relationships. 
Accordingly, this Comment proposes that healthcare providers 
engaged in such practices should be bound by the Pennsylvania Credit 
Services Act—a statute designed to regulate “credit services 
organizations” that assist consumers in obtaining credit. Whether 
providers can qualify as credit services organizations will depend upon a 
showing that they receive valuable consideration in return for assisting 
patients to obtain credit. This Comment will analyze the plausibility and 
 
*J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University School of Law, 2019. Special thanks 
to Robin for sticking with me through three years of law school; to Professor Jim Hawkins 
for his tremendously helpful feedback; and to the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s 
Healthcare Section for exposing me to a variety of interesting legal issues during my 
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likely effect of regulating healthcare providers as credit services 
organizations, and will ultimately conclude that the Credit Services Act 
offers an immediately practicable, albeit imperfect, safeguard against 
unrestrained promotion of medical credit. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, Americans have faced continually-increasing 
healthcare expenses,1 and as a result, specialized medical creditors like 
CareCredit have carved out a profitable niche in the marketplace.2 These 
medical credit products are routinely offered to patients around the country 
by dentists, veterinarians, optometrists, and other healthcare professionals 
in markets that consist primarily of uninsured or underinsured patients.3 
Medical creditors offer patients attractive deferred-interest financing to 
pay for expensive treatment over time without accruing interest.4 There is 
always a catch, however, and for deferred-interest medical credit, this 
catch is the risk of a massive interest charge for patients who do not pay 
off their balance in time.5 
Companies like CareCredit surely provide a valuable service to 
financially savvy patients who recognize this catch and plan for it. 
However, problems arise when patients think they are getting something 
like a regular credit card that simply does not charge interest.6 Given that 
most patients receive assistance from their healthcare providers in 
obtaining medical credit,7 one would naturally expect these trusted 
providers to ensure that their patients fully understand the obligations they 
are incurring. Unfortunately, many providers have failed to live up to this 
expectation.8 Financial incentives drive providers to vigorously promote 
these medical credit products,9 and in some cases, providers have even 
pressured or misled patients into utilizing medical credit.10 
Such unrestrained healthcare provider promotion of medical credit 
can have adverse consequences on individual patients and on the economy 
at large.11 A wealth of empirical evidence shows that consumer credit 
 
 1. See infra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.  
 2. See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.  
 3. See infra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.  
 4. See Nora Dowd Eisenhower & Beverly Yang, What’s the Deal with Health Care 
Credit Cards? Four Things You Should Know, U.S. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU BLOG 
(Feb. 5, 2014), http://bit.ly/2S8hSf5. 
 5. See id.  
 6. See Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces Agreement 
with GE Capital Retail Bank and CareCredit LLC (June 3, 2013), 
http://on.ny.gov/2Du30Bp [hereinafter N.Y. A.G. Press Release]. 
 7. See Patients Using Health Credit Cards? Settlement Requires New Protections, 
27 HEALTH CARE COLLECTOR 9, 9 (2013) (finding that 65% of CareCredit cardholders 
applied for the card while at their providers’ offices). 
 8. See N.Y. A.G. Press Release, supra note 6. 
 9. See infra Sections III.A.2 (discussing how providers benefit by assisting patients 
to finance treatment the patients would not otherwise purchase), III.A.3 (discussing 
payments received by providers in exchange for facilitating medical credit transactions). 
 10. See N.Y. A.G. Press Release, supra note 6. 
 11. See infra Section II.A.2.  
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markets are already rife with behavioral biases that impair rational 
decision-making.12 This impairment is likely exacerbated in clinical 
settings, such that patients faced with borrowing decisions are especially 
susceptible to provider recommendations.13 When providers influence 
patients to make unwise use of medical credit, the end result is an ever-
expanding medical debt load that burdens patients across the country.14 
Furthermore, to the extent that such conduct causes financial harm to 
patients, providers likely undermine the trust that is necessary for 
functional therapeutic relationships.15 
With these concerns in mind, this Comment proposes that 
governmental action must be taken to ensure that healthcare providers 
behave in a responsible and ethical manner when promoting medical 
credit. Except in cases of outright fraud, no legal penalties exist to 
counteract the incentives that encourage providers to maximize patient 
utilization of medical credit.16 However, the Pennsylvania Attorney 
General recently attempted to solve this problem through enforcement of 
an existing statute—the Pennsylvania Credit Services Act17 (CSA)—
against Allcare Dental for its unethical credit promotion practices.18 
Unfortunately, this litigation settled in 2018, leaving unresolved its central 
issue of first impression: whether a healthcare provider that facilitates 
patient use of medical credit qualifies as a “credit services organization” 
(CSO) under the CSA.19 
This Comment argues that the CSA should be enforced against 
healthcare providers as a means to prevent financial harm to patients 
caused by imprudent use of medical credit. In order to demonstrate the 
legal validity of this proposed enforcement scheme, Part III of this 
Comment will explain the ways in which healthcare providers like Allcare 
 
 12. For instance, consumers tend to be shortsighted about future costs and overly 
optimistic about their ability to pay off debt in a timely manner. See infra notes 31–33 and 
accompanying text.  
 13. More specifically, patients are likely influenced by the trust they place in their 
providers, the increased ease of borrowing with provider assistance, and the concurrent 
stress associated with decisions about personal health. See infra notes 41–54 and 
accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 65–72 and accompanying text.  
 15. See infra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.  
 16. See Jim Hawkins, Doctors as Bankers: Evidence from Fertility Markets, 84 TUL. 
L.R. 841, 882–91 (2010) [hereinafter Hawkins, Doctors as Bankers].  
 17. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2181–92 (West 2018).  
 18. See Complaint in Equity and Petition for Permanent Injunction at 21–33, 
Commonwealth v. Allcare Dental Management, Inc., No. 150 M.D. 2011 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. Mar. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Allcare Complaint].  
 19. See Docket Sheet at 19–20, Commonwealth v. Allcare Dental Management, Inc., 
No. 150 M.D. 2011 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 22, 2018), http://bit.ly/2Gq0Jr8 [hereinafter 
Allcare Docket Sheet]; see also infra Section III.A.  
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can satisfy the statutory definition of CSO.20 In order for these providers 
to be bound by the CSA, they must receive valuable consideration from 
patients in exchange for assistance with obtaining credit.21 Providers may 
satisfy this definitional requirement through two legal theories of 
consideration—facilitated sales and indirect payment—even without 
charging patients outright for such credit services.22 Ultimately, this 
Comment will conclude that the CSA provides a feasible scheme for 
regulating healthcare providers engaged in the promotion of medical 
credit.23 Moreover, this scheme can provide a model for similar 
enforcement efforts by other states with CSA-cognate statutes.24 
II. BACKGROUND 
This Part will examine the problems associated with healthcare 
provider promotion of medical credit, as well as a potential solution—
namely, regulation under the Pennsylvania CSA. First, this Part discusses 
behavioral economics research indicating that provider involvement in 
patient borrowing decisions likely impairs rational consideration of 
medical credit products, potentially resulting in economic harm to those 
who choose to finance their treatment with such products.25 Second, this 
Part argues that, insofar as providers influence these patients to incur 
financial obligations that they cannot afford, such practices likely 
contribute to the rising tide of medical debt in the United States and erode 
patient trust in healthcare providers.26 Third, this Part discusses provisions 
of the Pennsylvania CSA that may serve as an effective vehicle for 
government regulation of such practices.27 Finally, this Part will address 
the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s recent effort to hold a dental provider 
accountable for its failure to follow the CSA’s requirements in promoting 
medical credit products.28 
A. The Need for Regulation of Healthcare Providers Engaged 
in Promoting Medical Credit Products 
One can hardly craft a sensible solution to any problem without first 
identifying exactly what the problem is. Thus, in order to understand how 
and why the Pennsylvania CSA should be applied to regulate healthcare 
 
 20. See infra Part III.  
 21. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2182. 
 22. See infra Sections III.A.2–.3.  
 23. See infra Section III.C. 
 24. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.  
 25. See infra Section II.A.1.  
 26. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 27. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 28. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 872 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 123:3 
providers that solicit patient use of medical credit, we must first examine 
the consumer harms that regulation under the CSA would seek to remedy. 
1. Behavioral Economic Patterns in Patient Utilization of Medical 
Credit29 
Consumer credit markets are rife with behavioral anomalies that 
drive suboptimal borrowing decisions.30 Researchers theorize that 
excessive optimism and myopia commonly lead credit card users to 
underestimate their future costs.31 In this context, excessive optimism 
refers to the tendency of consumers to underestimate their future 
borrowing and overestimate their ability to avoid higher post-introductory 
interest rates.32 Similarly, myopia, or “hyperbolic discounting,” causes 
consumers to overvalue short-term benefits of credit use (such as low 
teaser introductory rates, rewards, and low monthly payments) relative to 
long-term risks (such as high post-introductory interest rates and various 
fees).33 
In medical credit markets, excessive optimism and myopia are 
reflected by patient decisions to borrow under deferred-interest 
financing.34 These deferred-interest financing plans allow patients to pay 
zero interest for an introductory period, but if a borrowing patient fails to 
pay off the debt in full within this time, the creditor will retroactively 
charge interest on the patient’s entire starting balance from the date of 
 
 29. This subpart relies heavily on the work of law professor Jim Hawkins, Professor 
of Law at the University of Houston Law Center, one of only a few legal scholars that has 
devoted significant attention to the medical credit industry. See generally Jim Hawkins, 
Toward Behaviorally Informed Policies for Consumer Credit Decisions in Self-Pay 
Medical Markets, in NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 172 
(Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2016) (discussing behavioral economic issues in medical credit 
markets and possible reform efforts) [hereinafter Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed 
Policies]; Hawkins, Doctors as Bankers, supra note 16 (discussing issues associated with 
doctor promotion of medical credit in the context of fertility care).  
 30. See Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 174.  
 31. See id.; Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The Card Act and 
Beyond, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 976 (2012).  
 32. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1375–76, 1405–
07 (2004); Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 174. Credit card 
issuers commonly utilize low introductory interest rates, also known as “teaser” rates, to 
attract potential customers; during an initial teaser period, the cardholder’s balance accrues 
interest at a relatively low rate, if at all, but when the teaser period ends, the cardholder 
must pay a significantly higher post-introductory interest rate. See Bar-Gill, supra, at 1392. 
 33. See Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 174; Bar-Gill, 
supra note 32, at 1408; Jason Kilborn, Behavioral Economics, Overindebtedness and 
Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy: Searching for Causes and Evaluating Solutions, 22 
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 13, 21–22, 37–38 (2005); Jonathan Slowik, Credit Card Act II: 
Expanding Credit Card Reform by Targeting Behavioral Biases, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1292, 
1308–13 (2012). 
 34. See Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 174–75. 
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purchase.35 In the medical credit market, these deferred interest rates are 
often astronomically high; for example, CareCredit, a prominent medical 
creditor, charges 26.99% APR interest on deferred-interest payment 
plans.36 
The New York Attorney General conducted an investigation of 
CareCredit, which found that 9 out of 10 consumers chose the deferred-
interest option, and one-quarter of those consumers failed to pay off their 
balances before the 26.99% interest took effect—frequently because they 
did not understand the terms.37 This troubling statistic suggests that 
patients are excessively optimistic about their ability to pay back medical 
debt before the high deferred-interest rate activates, and are likewise 
myopic in overvaluing the initial zero percent interest period relative to 
the long-term risk of incurring exorbitant finance charges.38 Researchers 
contend that the effects of excessive optimism and myopia in medical 
credit markets produce a “behavioral market failure,” insofar as 
“consumers misjudge the cost relative to the value of the product.”39 
Moreover, healthcare provider-facilitated utilization of third-party 
medical credit is hypothesized to produce behavioral anomalies that, 
unlike excessive optimism and myopia, are unique to the context of patient 
borrowing decisions.40 First, the relationship between healthcare providers 
and medical creditors likely produces a halo effect, whereby the trust that 
patients place in their healthcare providers translates to more favorable 
evaluations of the creditors that they promote.41 While no direct evidence 
of this halo effect in the medical credit context yet exists, ample evidence 
exists to show that patients trust their doctors’ recommendations and 
indeed prefer for doctors to make treatment decisions rather than deciding 
for themselves.42 
 
 35. See Eisenhower & Yang, supra note 4. 
 36. CareCredit Credit Card Account Agreement, CARECREDIT 2, 4 (2017), 
https://www.carecredit.com/YourTerms/June2017.pdf. Compare CareCredit’s 26.99% 
APR to the national average APR for all consumer credit card accounts at the end of 2018: 
14.73%. See Consumer Credit—G.19, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS. (Mar. 7, 2019), 
http://bit.ly/2ILMDld.  
 37. N.Y. A.G. Press Release, supra note 6.  
 38. See Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 174–75; Bar-Gill, 
supra note 32, at 1405; Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 31, at 975–77. Furthermore, the effects 
of myopia in patient borrowing decisions are likely compounded by medical creditors’ 
efforts to frame deferred-interest plans in a way that emphasize the short-term benefit of 
low monthly payments. See Hawkins, Doctors as Bankers, supra note 16, at 859. 
 39. Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 175. 
 40. See id.  
 41. See id.  
 42. See Russell Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice 
Architecture: The Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Health Care Cost Crisis, 
112 MICH. L. REV. 523, 540–41 (2014). 
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Professor Jim Hawkins, a medical credit scholar, posits that the 
confirmation bias43 causes patients to interpret new information about their 
doctors in a way that will comport with their preexisting sense of trust.44 
As such, Professor Hawkins infers that patients interpret the information 
they receive from doctors regarding third-party financing options in a 
positive manner that comports with the trust they place in their doctors.45 
This proposed halo effect is likely exacerbated to the extent that the 
creditor and doctor display each other’s logos and other intellectual 
property,46 confusing patients as to the relationship between doctor and 
creditor.47 Whatever the cause, healthcare providers undoubtedly have 
profound influence over patient utilization of medical credit; indeed, 
CareCredit reported that over half of its cardholders said they would have 
postponed or reduced the scope of their treatment had their providers not 
offered financing.48 
Second, patient decisions to accept medical credit under the guidance 
of healthcare providers are likely impacted by reduced salience due to 
automation and cognitive load.49 Automation effects result from the ease 
and speed with which patients can be approved for medical credit, thereby 
 
 43. “Confirmation bias, as the term is typically used in the psychological literature, 
connotes the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, 
expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.” Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A 
Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).  
 44. See Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 175; see also 
Richard G. Frank, Behavioral Economics and Health Economics, in BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 205, 205–06 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartianen eds., 
2007) (showing that patients tend to avoid attributing adverse treatment outcome data to 
doctor performance). 
 45. See Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 175. 
 46. See id. at 175–76. For example, CareCredit receives a nonexclusive license to use 
the “name, trademarks, logos and other marks” from all participating healthcare 
professionals in connection with its “administration and operation.” Card Acceptance 
Agreement for Participating Professionals, CARECREDIT § 16(k) (2016), available at 
https://perma.cc/3EXH-LEBT [hereinafter CareCredit Agreement for Participating 
Professionals] (CareCredit no longer publishes the current version of this agreement on its 
website; accordingly, this Comment relies on an archived prior version). Likewise, all 
participating healthcare professionals must agree to display CareCredit point-of-sale 
signage. Id. § 2(a).  
 47. See Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 175–76. Indeed, 
medical creditors like CareCredit appear to be fully aware of this potential for confusion, 
as its participation agreement with healthcare providers grants CareCredit a limited power 
of attorney to deposit patient checks mistakenly made out to providers, and likewise, 
requires providers to hold in trust any patient payments intended for CareCredit. See 
CareCredit Agreement for Participating Professionals, supra note 46, § 3(g). This concern 
is validated by the New York Attorney General’s finding that a number of CareCredit 
customers mistakenly believed that they were signing up for in-house payment plans with 
their providers. See N.Y. A.G. Press Release, supra note 6.  
 48. Synchrony Financial, Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 15 (Feb. 22, 2018). Note that 
CareCredit is a subsidiary of Synchrony Financial. Id. at 7. 
 49. See Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 176. 
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reducing the salience of potentially risky credit terms that may otherwise 
deter patients.50 While this automation effect has not been directly 
demonstrated in the context of provider-facilitated medical credit 
transactions, research in other contexts has found analogous effects.51 
Furthermore, patients considering whether to accept medical credit 
products recommended by their healthcare providers likely suffer from 
high cognitive load, as these decisions often take place in providers’ 
offices while patients are simultaneously making stressful decisions about 
whether to accept costly and potentially hazardous or life-changing health 
treatments.52 Researchers have found that “unfamiliar, tense, or 
distracting” situations tax an individual’s cognitive faculties, diverting 
attention away from the decision-making process.53 These findings 
suggest that when patients under cognitive load make medical credit 
decisions, potentially adverse credit terms have reduced salience and 
patients are left more susceptible to both internal biases and external 
influences like doctor recommendations.54 
In summary, a number of different behavioral anomalies influence 
patients to make suboptimal decisions in accepting deferred-interest 
medical credit products.55 Patients faced with these credit decisions in 
clinical settings may defer to their healthcare providers’ recommendations 
without rational consideration of the risks and benefits.56 Patient 
deliberation is likely further impaired by expedited credit approval 
processes and concurrent stress associated with decisions about personal 
health.57 Unlike excessive optimism and myopia, which are theorized to 
influence virtually all consumer credit decisions, these behavioral 
anomalies are specific to medical credit markets.58 Accordingly, the 
 
 50. See id. In the part of its website directed toward providers, CareCredit emphasizes 
the ease and speed with which patients can gain access to credit. See Frequently Asked 
Questions, CARECREDIT, https://gosyf.com/2yJGaAI (last visited Aug. 2, 2019) (stating 
that patients receive decisions on their credit applications “within seconds,” and that “office 
staff can then process charges to the cardholder account immediately”). 
 51. See Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 176; see also, e.g., 
Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates 34–35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 12924, 2007) (finding that the reduced salience of automated 
toll collection increases toll prices while decreasing elasticity of demand as compared to 
manual toll collection). 
 52. See Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 176. 
 53. Michael S. Barr et al., Behaviorally Informed Regulations, in THE BEHAVIORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 440, 442 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013). 
 54. See Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 176–77. 
 55. See id. at 174–77.  
 56. See id. at 175.  
 57. See id. at 176–77.  
 58. See id. at 174–75.  
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involvement of healthcare professionals in patient borrowing arguably 
poses unique risks that justify government intervention.59 
2. Medical Credit’s Contribution to Patient Debt and Distrust of 
Providers 
Although medical credit may expand access to important health 
services that patients could not otherwise afford, it can also lead patients 
to incur unmanageable debt with long-lasting financial consequences.60 
Given the influence that healthcare providers can have over patient 
borrowing decisions,61 these providers have a responsibility to exercise 
their influence in an ethical manner. Otherwise, unrestrained provider 
promotion of medical credit may erode consumer trust in the health 
professions and contribute to increasing medical debt and bankruptcy in 
the United States.62 In light of these consumer welfare concerns, such 
practices should be regulated under the CSA. 
In recent years, patients across the nation have faced increased out-
of-pocket healthcare expenses and related debt.63 Although the annual 
growth rate of healthcare costs has slowed in recent years, it continues to 
outpace both Gross Domestic Product and average family income.64 As a 
consequence, consumer medical debt is exceedingly common in the 
United States.65 In Pennsylvania alone, 21.8% of residents had past-due 
 
 59. See id. at 179. To be sure, without further empirical research of medical credit 
markets, one cannot conclude with certainty that the aforementioned behavioral anomalies 
exert significant influence on consumer decisions in this context; nonetheless, Professor 
Hawkins argues that policymakers should not “wait for perfect knowledge” to take action. 
See id. at 177–78. Furthermore, Professor Hawkins asserts that medical credit markets are 
especially compatible with the previously described behavioral economic model of 
consumer choice (though his reasoning is beyond the scope of this Comment). See id. at 
178. 
 60. See id. at 174.  
 61. See supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text. 
 62. See infra notes 65–72, 80–85 and accompanying text.  
 63. See generally SARA L. COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, TOO HIGH A 
PRICE: OUT-OF-POCKET HEALTH CARE COSTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2014), 
http://bit.ly/2DUPWUm (discussing research findings on various types of out-of-pocket 
healthcare costs faced by U.S. consumers); LIZ HAMEL ET AL., THE KAISER FAMILY 
FOUNDATION, THE BURDEN OF MEDICAL DEBT: RESULTS FROM THE KAISER FAMILY 
FOUNDATION/NEW YORK TIMES MEDICAL BILLS SURVEY (2016), http://bit.ly/2DSmVZ7 
(discussing research findings on the prevalence of medical debt among U.S. consumers). 
 64. PWC HEALTH RES. INST., MEDICAL COST TREND: BEHIND THE NUMBERS 2018, at 3 
(June 2017), https://pwc.to/2GbzXTX. 
 65. See U.S. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS: A STUDY OF 
MEDICAL AND NON-MEDICAL DEBT COLLECTIONS 18, 51 (2014), http://bit.ly/2RGSJ78 
(finding that medical collections tradelines—i.e., seriously delinquent accounts—
accounted for over half of all collections tradelines and appeared on nearly one in five U.S. 
consumer credit reports, affecting around 42.9 million Americans); HAMEL ET AL., supra 
note 63, at 1 (finding that that over one-quarter of Americans struggled to pay a medical 
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medical debt during 2015.66 Moreover, medical debt can have adverse 
consequences beyond run-of-the-mill financial strain; in severe cases, it 
can cause, or at least contribute to, personal bankruptcy.67 A number of 
researchers have concluded that medical debt contributes to more than half 
of all personal bankruptcies, though the precise extent to which medical 
debt drives personal bankruptcy has been hotly debated.68 
Although no data is readily available to show the exact degree to 
which medical credit products contribute to medical debt and bankruptcy, 
existing evidence suggests that it is substantial. As of early 2019, the 
medical credit industry earns approximately $24 billion in annual 
revenue.69 CareCredit alone has a network of over 200,000 participating 
professionals and 11 million cardholders.70 Moreover, CareCredit’s parent 
corporation, Synchrony Financial, revealed in its most recent annual report 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that CareCredit was 
owed almost $9 billion in loan receivables at the end of 2017 and booked 
over $42 billion in revenue from loan interest and fees that year.71 This 
 
bill in 2015, and more than half of these individuals owed over $2,500, while 13% owed 
over $10,000). 
 66. MICHAEL KARPMAN & KYLE J. CASWELL, URBAN INST., PAST-DUE MEDICAL DEBT 
AMONG NONELDERLY ADULTS, 2012–15, at 6–7 (2017), https://urbn.is/2t4GOpF. 
 67. See Donald D. Hackney et al., What is the Actual Prevalence of Medical 
Bankruptcies?, 43 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 1284, 1284 (2015). 
 68. Compare David U. Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury as Contributors to 
Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVE) W5-63, 66, 70 (2005), http://bit.ly/2RC6ST2 
(finding that 54.5% of all personal bankruptcy filings could be classified as medical 
bankruptcies, which primarily affected middle-class debtors), and Hackney et al., supra 
note 67, at 1295 (finding that, after accounting for misclassification, the actual prevalence 
of medical bankruptcy is approximately 50%), with David Dranove & Michael L. 
Millenson, Medical Bankruptcy: Myth Versus Fact, 25 HEALTH AFF. 74, 74 (2006) (finding 
that medical debt only causes 17% of personal bankruptcies, which primarily affected those 
with incomes near poverty level), and Tal Gross & Matthew J. Notowidigdo, Health 
Insurance and the Consumer Bankruptcy Decision: Evidence from Expansions of 
Medicaid, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 767, 776 (2011) (finding that prevalence of medical bankruptcy 
is closer to 26% and primarily affects lower-income households). But see Melissa B. 
Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y, LAW, & ETHICS 239, 240–43 (2010) (finding that medical bankruptcy 
research based on court records fails to account for the common scenario in which 
consumers pay off medical debt using credit cards and home equity loans prior to filing for 
bankruptcy, such that little to no medical debt appears in their records). 
 69. See Medical Patient Financing: Market Research Report, IBISWORLD (Jan. 
2019), http://bit.ly/2DOYrQt. Furthermore, this amount that has grown for the past five 
years. Id. 
 70. About Us, CARECREDIT, https://gosyf.com/2MWfJyp (last visited on Aug. 2, 
2019). 
 71. Synchrony Financial, Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 91 (Feb. 22, 2018). 
Furthermore, CareCredit’s loan receivables and interest revenue both grew significantly 
between 2015 and 2017. Id.  
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data indicates that medical creditors are responsible for at least several 
billion dollars-worth of outstanding medical debt in the United States.72 
The medical credit industry’s contribution to medical debt is likely 
concentrated in self-pay markets like dentistry, which are characterized by 
high numbers of uninsured patients and high out-of-pocket costs even with 
insurance.73 Unsurprisingly, almost two-thirds of CareCredit’s loan 
revenue comes from financing dental care,74 and more than half of its 
participating professionals are dentists.75 Indeed, CareCredit partners with 
“networks of healthcare practitioners that provide elective and other 
procedures that generally are not fully covered by insurance.”76 Given that 
provider promotion of medical credit appears to chiefly impact patients in 
self-pay markets like dentistry, consumer protection efforts should target 
these markets.77 
Beyond mere economic consequences, provider promotion of 
medical credit products may have adverse consequences for patient trust 
in healthcare professionals. To illustrate this concern, consider that 
CareCredit is endorsed by over 100 professional associations, such as the 
American Dental Association.78 Over half of these endorsements are paid 
endorsements in which the association receives payment linked to the 
number of its members enrolled in the program and the volume of business 
that they refer.79 Law professor Gina Calabrese has observed that these 
practices present a conflict of interest for healthcare professionals: 
 
 72. See id.  
 73. See Marko Vujicic, Time to Rethink Dental “Insurance”, 147 J. AM. DENTAL ASS’N 
907, 907–09 (2016); see also Hawkins, Doctors as Bankers, supra note 16, at 856 n.65, 861 
(discussing the prevalence of medical credit utilization for fertility treatments and other 
self-pay procedures). See also HAMEL ET AL., supra note 63, at 7 (finding that 41% of survey 
respondents struggled to pay a dental bill in 2015, and 12% reported that dental bills 
constituted the largest share of bills they struggled to pay); BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE 
SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2017, at 23 (May 
2018), http://bit.ly/2D9gFe1 (finding that 19% of survey respondents reported forgoing 
needed dental care due to the cost, a higher percentage than for any other type of medical 
service included in the survey). 
 74. Synchrony Financial, Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 14 (Feb. 22, 2018). 
CareCredit’s remaining revenue comes from other self-pay medical markets like vision, 
veterinary, and cosmetic care. Id. 
 75. Compare Help Put Dental Care Within Reach of Your Patients, CARECREDIT, 
https://gosyf.com/2GooOOY (last visited on Feb. 2, 2019) (noting that over 100,000 dental 
providers are enrolled with CareCredit), with Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 50 
(noting that over 200,000 total providers are enrolled with CareCredit). 
 76. Synchrony Financial, Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 14 (Feb. 22, 2018). 
 77. The Pennsylvania Attorney General’s claims against Allcare Dental for violations 
of the CSA lend credence to this view. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 78. Synchrony Financial, Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 14 (Feb. 22, 2018). 
 79. Id. As a result of the New York Attorney General’s settlement with CareCredit in 
2013, CareCredit can no longer use these paid endorsements in marketing its credit 
products to New York consumers. See N.Y. A.G. Press Release, supra note 6. 
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“[w]hen you have doctors promoting cards and loans with unconscionable 
finance terms as if they were sales agents for the lenders, it raises serious 
ethical issues, given the trust patients place in physicians, whose first 
obligation should be to their patients.”80 Pennsylvania courts have gone so 
far as to state that medical professionals owe a fiduciary duty to their 
patients, though no case has yet addressed the scope of this duty with 
regard to financial matters.81 
In any event, a 2014 study found that patients’ trust in their healthcare 
providers is significantly influenced by financial factors; a majority of 
Americans believe that high costs are the biggest problem facing the 
healthcare system, and lower-income patients are less trusting of their 
doctors.82 These findings led the authors to conclude that medical 
professionals must make a stronger effort to care for the financial health 
of patients.83 Moreover, evidence suggests that patient trust in their 
medical providers may have significant health consequences.84 Thus, 
regulation of healthcare providers under the Pennsylvania CSA can serve 
the valuable social purpose of preserving trust in patient-provider 
relationships that may otherwise suffer from unrestrained promotion of 
potentially harmful medical credit products.85 
 
 
 80. Credit cards and finance lines for medical care, CONSUMER REPORTS, 
http://bit.ly/2RETT2N (last updated July 2008). 
 81. See Weiley v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 51 A.3d 202, 217–18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2012); see also Toney v. Chester Cty. Hosp., 961 A.2d 192, 199–200 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008), 
aff’d, 614 Pa. 98 (2011). But see Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 
n.10 (Cal. 1990) (concluding that a doctor’s fiduciary duty to his patient did not extend to 
financial matters, only health-related matters). Given modern research on the impact of 
financial distress on physical and psychological health, one may plausibly argue that 
financial matters are health-related matters within a doctor’s fiduciary duty. See John A. 
Sturgeon et al., The Psychosocial Context of Financial Stress: Implications for 
Inflammation and Psychological Health, 78 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 134, 141 (2016). 
 82. Robert J. Blendon et al., Public Trust in Physicians—U.S. Medicine in 
International Perspective, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1570, 1571–72 (2014).  
 83. Id. at 1572. 
 84. See Kathryn Whetten et al., Exploring Lack of Trust in Care Providers and the 
Governments as Barrier to Health Service Use, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 716, 719–20 (2006) 
(finding that HIV patients’ trust in healthcare providers was positively associated with 
treatment plan compliance and favorable health outcomes); Donald Musa et al., Trust in 
the Healthcare System and Use of Preventive Health Services by Older Black and White 
Adults, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1293, 1297 (2009) (finding that patients’ trust in their 
physicians “played a significant role” in increasing utilization of preventive health 
services). 
 85. See Roy Spece et al., An Empirical Method for Materiality: Would Conflict of 
Interest Disclosures Change Patient Decisions?, 40 AM. J. L. & MED. 253, 261–62, 268–
69 (2014) (finding that disclosure of physicians’ financial conflicts of interest reduced 
patient trust and increased likelihood that patients would reject physicians’ treatment 
recommendations). 
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B. Regulation of Healthcare Providers Under the Pennsylvania 
Credit Services Act 
Thus far, government regulation of healthcare providers engaged in 
promoting medical credit has been virtually nonexistent.86 Instead, 
regulators have sought to advance consumer protection in medical credit 
markets through creditor-side enforcement actions, as demonstrated by the 
U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s $34.1 million restitution 
order against CareCredit for deceptive credit card enrollment practices.87 
However, this piecemeal creditor-side enforcement fails to regulate the 
medical credit industry as a whole, and likewise fails to impose any legal 
duty on healthcare providers to act in their patients’ best interests when 
promoting risky deferred-interest medical credit products.88 
Although specialized legislation might provide the best long-term 
solution to this issue,89 the legislative process is notoriously slow, and 
Pennsylvania already has a law on the books—the CSA—that can serve to 
regulate healthcare providers engaged in medical credit promotion. 
Furthermore, a number of other states have laws that are closely analogous 
to the Pennsylvania CSA,90 which may allow the enforcement scheme 
proposed by this Comment to serve as a model for consumer protection 
efforts across the nation. 
1. Relevant Provisions of the Pennsylvania Credit Services Act and 
Proposed Application to Healthcare Providers 
The CSA applies to “credit services organizations” (CSOs), which it 
defines as: 
[a] person who, with respect to the extension of credit by others, sells, 
provides or performs . . . any of the following services in return for the 
payment of money or other valuable consideration: . . . (iii) Obtaining 
an extension of credit for a buyer.91  
 
 86. See Hawkins, Doctors as Bankers, supra note 16, at 882–91.  
 87. See CFPB Orders GE CareCredit to Refund $34.1 Million for Deceptive Health-
Care Credit Card Enrollment, U.S. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Dec. 10, 2013), 
http://bit.ly/2GhH2Sk; see also N.Y. A.G. Press Release, supra note 6.  
 88.  See Hawkins, Doctors as Bankers, supra note 16, at 884–86. 
 89. See id. at 891–96 (discussing proposed legislative solutions to address healthcare 
providers engaged in promoting medical credit products). 
 90. See, e.g., California Credit Services Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789.12(a) (West 
2018); Maryland Credit Services Business Act, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-1901(e) 
(West 2018); Illinois Credit Services Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 605/3(d) (West 
2018); Wisconsin Credit Services Organizations Act, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 422.501(2) (West 
2018).  
 91. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2182 (West 2018).  
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Assuming that healthcare providers can satisfy this definition,92 the 
CSA provides a number of safeguards and remedies that can be enforced 
to ensure that healthcare providers adequately guard their patient’s 
interests when promoting third-party medical credit products. The 
following paragraphs will discuss provisions of the CSA that can be 
enforced against healthcare providers in order to prevent patient financial 
distress and maintain trust in patient-provider relationships.93 
First, Section 2186(a)94 of the CSA requires that CSOs execute a 
signed, written contract with each buyer that must contain “[t]he terms of 
payment to be made by the buyer, including the total of all payments to be 
made by the buyer, whether to the credit services organization or to some 
other person.”95 Likewise, the contract must contain “[a] full and detailed 
description of the services to be performed by the credit services 
organization for the buyer, including all guarantees.”96 If the provider’s 
credit services will be indirectly compensated by the patient through funds 
tendered to the third-party creditor,97 then presumably Section 2186(a) 
would require the credit services contract to disclose any such indirect 
payment.98 This disclosure could serve to elucidate the provider’s 
pecuniary relationship with a third-party creditor, which may thereby 
dispel the influence of any halo effect on the patient’s borrowing 
decision.99 
Second, Section 2186(c) provides that credit service contracts must 
be accompanied by a standard notice of cancellation that informs buyers 
of their right to cancel the contract within five days of its execution.100 The 
notice of cancellation provision effectively provides a five-day “cooling 
off period” for patients to reconsider their decision to use medical credit.101 
Thus, patients enrolling in a medical credit program with the assistance of 
a healthcare provider would likely be required to wait five days before 
using the credit to pay for treatment.102 This “cooling off” period would 
 
 92. See infra at Section III.A.  
 93. See supra at Section II.A.2.  
 94. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2186(a) (West 2018).  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. See infra Section III.A.3 (discussing indirect payment as consideration for credit 
services).  
 98. This provision requires credit service contracts to contain all terms of payment to 
be made by the buyer, “whether to the credit services organization or to some other 
person.” See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2186(a) (emphasis added). 
 99. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 100. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2186(c). 
 101. See id.; Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 176.  
 102. See infra Section III.B. Medical credit products generally cannot be used to 
purchase any emergency services anyway, so this waiting period is unlikely to present any 
undue burden on healthcare access. See, e.g., CareCredit, Agreement for Participating 
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serve to counteract the reduced salience of credit terms that results from 
making rushed credit decisions in clinical settings.103 
Third, Sections 2184104 and 2185105 of the CSA require that a CSO 
provide an information sheet to each buyer, which must be signed by the 
buyer prior to execution of a written credit services contract.106 The 
information sheet must contain specified information regarding the 
services that the CSO will undertake to perform on behalf of the buyer, the 
buyer’s obligations to the CSO, and the buyer’s rights with respect to 
consumer credit reporting agencies.107 Again, the information sheet 
requirement may enable patients to make more informed decisions about 
whether to accept third-party credit.108 
Fourth, Section 2183(4)109 prohibits CSOs from making any “untrue 
or misleading representations,” or engaging in any “act, practice, or course 
of business,” that potentially operates as a “deception or fraud” upon any 
person in connection with the offer or sale of its services.110 If enforced, 
this broad prohibition on “untrue or misleading” conduct would likely 
cause providers to err on the side of greater disclosure and transparency 
when obtaining credit for patients.111 For instance, this provision would 
hopefully encourage providers to ensure that patients understand how 
 
Professionals, supra note 46, § 6(a)(xiii). If a patient is determined to make an immediate 
non-emergency purchase using a medical credit product, they can simply apply 
independently to avoid the five-day waiting period. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 2182, 2186 (West 2018) (limiting applicability of the CSA’s contract 
requirements to transactions between “buyers” and “credit services organizations” as 
defined in the statute; lending institutions like CareCredit are expressly excluded from the 
definition of “credit services organization,” so a direct transaction between a patient and 
CareCredit will not be subject to the CSA’s notice of cancellation or other provisions). 
Requiring such patients to apply for credit directly with a lender would still serve to 
eliminate or at least mitigate the influence of halo or automation effects caused by a 
provider’s facilitation of the lending process. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 103. See supra Section II.A.1. The wisdom of requiring such a “cooling off” period is 
affirmed by the New York Attorney General’s settlement with CareCredit, which 
prohibited charging a patient any amount over $1000 within three days of the patient’s 
initial application. See N.Y. A.G. Press Release, supra note 6. 
 104. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2184 (West 2018). 
 105. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2185 (West 2018). 
 106. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2184–85. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 180. 
 109. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2183(4) (West 2018).  
 110. See id. 
 111. See Hawkins, Behaviorally Informed Policies, supra note 29, at 180 (noting that 
healthcare providers are especially unlikely to attempt to “evade or thwart legal 
intervention”). 
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deferred-interest credit works, as many patients are likely unfamiliar with 
such arrangements.112 
Fifth, Section 2183(1) prohibits a CSO from accepting any payment 
or other valuable consideration until it has performed agreed-upon 
services in full.113 Thus, when a provider assists a patient with obtaining 
credit to finance the purchase of treatment, Section 2183(1) ostensibly 
prohibits the provider from charging the patient until the treatment is 
performed in full.114 For this to be true, such treatment would need to be 
part of the provider’s agreed-upon performance under the credit service 
contract.115 
Finally, consumers harmed by violations of the CSA are permitted to 
recover actual damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and even punitive 
damages if the trial court “deems it proper.”116 More importantly, Section 
2190(a)117 provides that violating any of the CSA’s provisions constitutes 
an “unfair trade practice” in violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL).118 In addition to 
creating a private right of action,119 the UTPCPL permits public 
enforcement actions for injunctive relief,120 restitution and costs,121 as well 
as civil penalties.122 As remedial legislation, the UTPCPL is to be 
construed liberally in order to achieve its purpose of preventing unfair or 
deceptive practices.123 Moreover, the Pennsylvania courts have interpreted 
the UTPCPL’s prohibition against unfair trade practices more broadly in 
public enforcement actions than in private ones.124 The fact that any 
violation of the CSA constitutes a per se violation of the UTPCPL 
indicates the legislature’s recognition that both statutes serve an 
overarching purpose of consumer protection,125 and for this reason, the 
 
 112. Indeed, the New York Attorney General’s investigation of CareCredit revealed 
that many patients were misled by providers into thinking that CareCredit was interest-
free. See N.Y. A.G. Press Release, supra note 6. 
 113. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2183(1). 
 114. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2183(1). The New York Attorney General’s 
investigation of CareCredit revealed that prepayment of providers was a common problem. 
See N.Y. A.G. Press Release, supra note 6. 
 115. See infra Section III.B.  
 116. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2191 (West 2018). 
 117. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2190(a) (West 2018). 
 118. See id.; 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201–1 to –9.3 (West 2018).  
 119. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201–9.2. 
 120. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201–4. 
 121. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201–4.1. 
 122. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201–8. 
 123. See Commonwealth ex rel. Creamer v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 
812, 815–17 (Pa. 1974). 
 124. See Commonwealth v. Percudani, 844 A.2d 35, 48 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004). 
 125. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2190 (West 2018). 
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CSA should also be liberally construed in public enforcement actions to 
achieve this purpose.126 
2. Pennsylvania’s Recent Litigation of Claims Under the CSA 
Against Allcare Dental 
In 2011, the Pennsylvania Attorney General filed suit against the 
Allcare Dental corporate family for violations of the CSA.127 At the time 
of this filing, the Office of Attorney General had received over 800 
consumer complaints against Allcare.128 The Attorney General alleged that 
Allcare Dental qualified as a CSO because it assisted patients with 
applying for third-party credit in order to finance the purchase of its dental 
products and services.129 According to the Attorney General’s theory, by 
obtaining extensions of credit on behalf of patients that would not have 
otherwise purchased Allcare’s products or services, Allcare received 
valuable consideration in the form of a prepaid customer.130 
Based on the premise that Allcare Dental acted as a CSO, the 
Attorney General’s Complaint alleged that Allcare violated the CSA in 
two ways.131 First, the Attorney General alleged that Allcare failed to 
provide patients with the CSA’s required written notice of cancellation.132 
Second, the Attorney General alleged that Allcare violated the CSA by 
requiring consideration from patients prior to rendering full performance 
of its obligations under the credit service agreement (as in, before Allcare 
provided dental work to the patient).133 In its Prayer for Relief, the 
Attorney General requested that Allcare be permanently enjoined from 
engaging in any practices found to violate the CSA, in addition to paying 
civil penalties and restitution to its patients for any such violations.134 
Although the Allcare litigation ultimately settled,135 it still laid a 
foundation for future efforts to regulate healthcare providers under the 
CSA—a foundation that can be analyzed and improved upon. 
To summarize, unrestrained provider promotion of medical credit 
risks serious economic harm to patients, as well as social harm to the trust 
placed in healthcare professionals. Fortunately, the Pennsylvania CSA 
exists to regulate businesses that assist consumers in obtaining credit, and 
 
 126. See Monumental Properties, 329 A.2d at 815–17; Percudani, 844 A.2d at 48. 
 127. See Allcare Complaint, supra note 18, at 21–33. 
 128. See id. at 5.  
 129. See id. at 9.  
 130. See id. at 10.  
 131. See id. at 21–33 
 132. See id at 28–33; 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2186 (West 2018). 
 133. See Allcare Complaint, supra note 18, at 21–28; 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 2183 (West 2018). 
 134. See Allcare Complaint, supra note 18, at 23–24, 27, 29–30, 33.  
 135. Allcare Docket Sheet, supra note 19, at 19–20. 
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the Allcare litigation offers hope that the CSA can be enforced against 
healthcare providers to ensure that patient borrowing decisions are not 
made on the basis of incomplete information or improper influence. 
III. ANALYSIS 
In order to enforce the CSA against healthcare providers that 
facilitate patient use of medical credit, these providers must qualify as 
CSOs.136 Specifically, these providers must perform credit services in 
return for “payment of money or other valuable consideration.”137 Whether 
healthcare providers can satisfy this definition is an issue of first 
impression in Pennsylvania. This Part will consider whether any provider 
could qualify as a CSO, and whether Allcare Dental in particular satisfied 
this definition.138 Assuming that Allcare did qualify as a CSO, this Part 
will further consider whether the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s 
specific claims against Allcare should have succeeded.139 Finally, this Part 
will recommend that several specific provisions of the CSA should be used 
in future enforcement efforts against healthcare providers.140 
A. Healthcare Providers that Promote Medical Credit Should 
Qualify as “Credit Services Organizations” Under the 
Credit Services Act 
As previously discussed,141 CSOs are defined as entities that perform 
credit services, such as “obtaining an extension of credit for the buyer,” in 
exchange for “payment of money or other valuable consideration.”142 For 
reasons that will be explained below,143 the Pennsylvania common law 
definition of contract “consideration” must govern the definition of this 
term within the CSA. 
Two primary theories of consideration exist to bring healthcare 
providers within the scope of the CSA. First, the facilitated sales theory 
proposes that a provider may receive consideration for its credit services 
in the form of increased sales revenue from patients who would not 
otherwise purchase treatment from the provider.144 The Pennsylvania 
Attorney General relied on this theory in its lawsuit against Allcare 
 
 136. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2182 (West 2018). 
 137. See id.  
 138. See infra Section III.A. 
 139. See infra Section III.B. 
 140. See infra Section III.C. 
 141. See supra Section II.B.1. 
 142. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2182 (West 2018).  
 143. See infra Section III.A.1. 
 144. See infra Section III.A.2.  
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Dental.145 Second, the indirect payment theory proposes that a provider 
may receive consideration for its credit services through payments that it 
receives from third-party creditors in exchange for facilitating patient 
credit use.146 Other states’ courts have relied on this theory in enforcing 
their CSA-analog statutes against tax preparers.147 
1. The CSA’s Definition of “Credit Services Organization” 
Incorporates the Pennsylvania Common Law of Contract 
Consideration 
When a Pennsylvania statute uses a legal term of art, such as 
“consideration,” this term is defined by the common law unless the statute 
evinces a legislative intent to the contrary.148 Nothing in the statutory text 
of the CSA implies any intent to alter the common law meaning of 
“consideration” as the term is used in defining “credit services 
organization.”149 Thus, to determine whether a healthcare provider 
qualifies as a CSO by obtaining credit for patients in exchange for the 
“payment of money or other valuable consideration,”150 we must first 
define “consideration” according to Pennsylvania common law. 
“Consideration” is an essential element of any enforceable contract; 
in simple terms, consideration is the “‘price’ of a promise.”151 
Consideration consists of a detriment to the promisee with some 
corresponding benefit to the promisor that both induces and is induced by 
the promise.152 Whether this process of reciprocal inducement actually 
occurred in a given case depends on “the motives manifested by the 
parties.”153 A helpful, but not dispositive, test for determining the intent of 
the parties is to ask whether the alleged consideration conferred any 
benefit on the promisor; if so, it is a “fair inference” that this benefit 
induced the promise.154 However, courts typically do not weigh the value 
 
 145. See Allcare Complaint, supra note 18, at 10.  
 146. See infra Section III.A.3.  
 147. See CashCall, Inc. v. Maryland Com’r of Fin. Regulation, 139 A.3d 990, 1004–05 
(Md. 2016); Fugate v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 81, 85–86 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); 
Harper v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 706 S.E.2d 63, 71 (W. Va. 2010).  
 148. See Bridgeford v. Groh, 160 A. 451, 453 (Pa. 1932) (“[A] statute should be so 
interpreted that it will accord, as nearly as may be, with the theretofore existing course of 
the common law.”); Commonwealth v. Hartung, 39 A.2d 734, 737 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1944) 
(“A statute does not work a change in the common law unless the intent to alter it clearly 
appears.”).  
 149. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2181–92 (West 2018).  
 150. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2182.  
 151. See Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. Am. Ash Recycling Corp. of Pa., 895 A.2d 595, 600 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). 
 152. See id. at 600–01. 
 153. See id. at 601.  
 154. See id.  
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of consideration relative to the promise for which it was exchanged.155 
Similarly, the consideration need not take any particular form; in the 
timeless words of Sir Edward Coke, a “horse, hawk, or robe” will 
suffice.156 
Furthermore, “consideration” is distinguished from a mere 
“condition” that is inherently required for the promisee to receive the 
benefit of a gratuitous promise.157 If the promisor’s promise is not induced 
by the promisee’s detriment, then the promised benefit is classified as a 
“conditional gift” and does not give rise to contractual rights or duties.158 
This distinction is best illustrated by the classic example in which a 
downtrodden man is promised a free coat if he simply walks to the store 
to retrieve it; walking to the store is merely a condition to receive the coat, 
not consideration for the gratuitous promise.159 
Thus, for a healthcare provider to qualify as a CSO, its patients must 
have paid money or other “valuable consideration” for the provider’s 
assistance with obtaining credit.160 Under the Pennsylvania common law, 
this requirement should be satisfied if the provider’s credit services 
induced patients to incur some detriment that, in turn, motivated the 
provider to offer these services.161 Two alternative theories of 
consideration may suffice to bring healthcare providers within the scope 
of the CSA: facilitated sales and indirect payment. 
2. Facilitated Sales as Consideration for Healthcare Provider Credit 
Services 
In the absence of outright payment for credit services, healthcare 
providers might satisfy the CSA’s consideration requirement162 in the form 
of increased sales revenue from patients using third-party credit that the 
provider helped them obtain. According to the Pennsylvania Attorney 
General’s complaint in the Allcare lawsuit, by obtaining extensions of 
credit on behalf of patients that would not have otherwise purchased 
Allcare’s products or services, Allcare received valuable consideration in 
the form of a “prepaid customer.”163 Indeed, patients who used Allcare’s 
credit services were required to sign a “Third-Party Financing Disclosure”  
 
 
 155. See Mikos v. Kida, 172 A. 101, 102 (Pa. 1934). 
 156. Pinnell’s Case (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 237; 5 Co. Rep. 117 a. 
 157. See Pennsy, 895 A.2d at 600.  
 158. See id.  
 159. See id. at 600–01.  
 160. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2182 (West 2018).  
 161. See Pennsy, 895 A.2d at 600–02. 
 162. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2182. 
 163. See Allcare Complaint, supra note 18, at 10.  
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form, which stated that: 
I [the buyer] acknowledge that the personal information being 
provided to Allcare Dental & Dentures (“Allcare”) is for the purpose 
of obtaining a loan or a line of credit from a third-party lender with no 
affiliation to Allcare, to finance the cost of dental work. Allcare will 
assist me [the buyer] in applying for credit . . . .164 
This excerpt states that Allcare’s credit services were provided for 
the purpose of financing dental work.165 This exchange satisfies the 
aforementioned reciprocal inducement model of consideration.166 To wit, 
Allcare’s promise to assist patients in obtaining credit induced them to 
debt-finance dental work that they would not purchase otherwise.167 
Likewise, by agreeing to purchase dental work, these patients induced 
Allcare to promise assistance with obtaining credit.168 
While the facilitated sales theory appears to satisfy the CSA’s 
consideration requirement, at least as “consideration” is defined under the 
common law, this theory has not been addressed by Pennsylvania courts. 
A few courts in other states with CSA-analog statutes169 have confronted 
the facilitated sales theory, though only one has accepted it.170 While these 
out-of-state cases are obviously not binding on Pennsylvania courts, they 
are nonetheless helpful for assessing the plausibility of the facilitated sales 
theory as it relates to enforcement of the CSA against healthcare providers. 
First, in Snook v. Ford Motor Co.,171 a customer filed suit under the 
Ohio Credit Services Organization Act172 (Ohio CSA) against an auto 
dealership that helped her obtain credit to purchase one of its vehicles.173 
The Ohio Court of Appeals concluded that, in order to qualify as a “buyer” 
of credit services, the customer would have to show that she exchanged 
valuable consideration of “money or its equivalent” specifically for the 
dealership’s assistance in obtaining credit.174 Otherwise, the court 
 
 164. Id. at 9–10 (emphasis removed).  
 165. See id. at 10.  
 166. See supra Section III.A.1.  
 167. See Allcare Complaint, supra note 18, at 10. 
 168. See id. 
 169. Compare 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2182 (West 2018), with OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN., § 4712.01(C) (West 2018), and 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/3(d) 
(West 2018), and WIS. STAT. ANN. § 422.501(2) (West 2018).  
 170. Compare Premium Air, Inc. v. Luchinski, No. 2006AP2976, 2007 WL 1345839, 
at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. May 9, 2007) (adopting facilitated sales theory), with Snook v. Ford 
Motor Co., 755 N.E.2d 380, 382–83 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting said theory), and 
Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 789 N.E.2d 1248, 1253–54 (Ill. 2003) (same).  
 171. Snook v. Ford Motor Co., 755 N.E.2d 380, 382–83 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
 172. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4712.01–.99 (West 2018).  
 173. Snook, 755 N.E.2d at 381. 
 174. See id. at 381–83. The trial court ruled in favor of the customer, reasoning that she 
purchased the dealer’s credit services as part of an inseparable “bundle” of goods and 
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reasoned, the dealership’s credit service was a mere gratuity.175 Notably, 
the court reserved judgment as to whether the dealership qualified as a 
CSO.176 
In contrast, the dissenting opinion implicitly endorsed the facilitated 
sales theory of consideration in concluding that the plaintiff qualified as a 
“buyer” under the Ohio CSA.177 The dissent reached this conclusion on 
the basis of the plaintiff’s unrebutted affidavit,178 which stated that she 
would not have purchased a vehicle from the dealership if it had not helped 
her obtain an extension of credit.179 The dissent reasoned that separate 
consideration for the credit service was not required for the plaintiff to 
qualify as a “buyer” under the Ohio CSA.180 
Next, in Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers,181 the Supreme 
Court of Illinois concluded that a home contractor, in obtaining credit for 
a customer who would not otherwise purchase the contractor’s windows 
and siding, did not qualify as a CSO under the Illinois Credit Services 
Organizations Act (Illinois CSA).182 As in Snook, the Midstate Siding 
court rejected the facilitated sales theory of consideration, reasoning that 
the Illinois CSA’s definition of CSO requires consideration specific to the 
provision of credit services, “not simply payment for other goods or 
services.”183 
However, the dissent in Midstate Siding endorsed the facilitated sales 
theory of consideration in concluding that the home contractor qualified 
as a CSO.184 The dissent reasoned that the home contractor received 
valuable consideration in return for its assistance with obtaining third-
party credit for customers, as without this financing, the contractor would 
not have been able to sell its windows and siding to these customers.185 
 
services that included the vehicle, and so qualified as a “buyer” under the Ohio CSA. See 
id. at 381–83. 
 175. See id. 
 176. See id. at 383.  
 177. See id. at 384 (Wolff, P.J., dissenting).  
 178. See id.  
 179. See id. at 383 (majority opinion).  
 180. See id. at 384 (Wolff, P.J., dissenting). 
 181. Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 789 N.E.2d 1248 (Ill. 2003). 
 182. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/1–/16 (West 2018); see Midstate Siding, 789 
N.E.2d at 1250–51, 1253–54. 
 183. See id. at 1253–54; cf. Snook, 755 N.E.2d at 383–84. Soon after Midstate Siding 
was decided, it was cited as precedent by the Appellate Court of Illinois in deciding that 
the Illinois CSA did not apply to a car dealership that assisted customers with obtaining 
third-party financing. See Cannon v. William Chevrolet/Geo, Inc., 794 N.E.2d 843, 849–
51 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).  
 184. See id. at 1257–58 (Kilbride, J., dissenting). On this issue, the dissent was in 
agreement with both the trial and intermediate appellate courts. See id. at 1251 (majority 
opinion).  
 185. See id. at 1257 (Kilbride, J., dissenting). 
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In contrast to the Snook and Midstate Siding courts, the Court of 
Appeals of Wisconsin concluded in Premium Air, Inc. v. Luchinski186 that 
the defendant HVAC business qualified as a CSO under the Wisconsin 
CSA187 by arranging third-party credit for customers to finance their 
purchase of a furnace and installation.188 The Premium Air court accepted 
the facilitated sales theory of consideration, reasoning that the defendant 
qualified as a CSO because “the money it receives from furnace sales via 
the financing arrangements it facilitates is the valuable consideration.”189 
Thus, of the three jurisdictions that have addressed the facilitated 
sales theory of consideration relied on by the Pennsylvania Attorney 
General in its Allcare lawsuit,190 only Wisconsin has accepted this 
theory.191 Although the leading Ohio and Illinois cases on this issue did 
not accept the facilitated sales theory,192 these cases are still not wholly 
unfavorable to the Attorney General’s argument. Both of these cases were 
arguably decided incorrectly, as both contained dissenting and lower court 
opinions in favor of the facilitated sales theory.193 As the Midstate Siding 
dissenter noted, the plain language of the Illinois CSA did not require that 
a CSO receives separate monetary consideration for their credit 
services.194 Similarly, the Pennsylvania CSA does not contain any express 
requirement of separate monetary consideration for credit services.195 
Notably, the Midstate Siding dissenter argued that the legislative 
intent of the Illinois CSA—to prevent financial harm to consumers—
favors application of the statute to retailers that promote third-party credit 
products.196 Like the Illinois CSA, the Pennsylvania CSA is remedial 
legislation aimed at preventing consumer harm,197 and as such, it should 
 
 186. Premium Air, Inc. v. Luchinski, No. 2006AP2976, 2007 WL 1345839 (Wis. Ct. 
App. May 9, 2007). The fact that this case was unpublished is immaterial to the present 
issue, as its reasoning is not rendered any less persuasive by this fact, and in any event, 
none of the aforementioned out-of-state cases have binding effect on Pennsylvania courts. 
 187. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 422.501–.506 (West 2018).  
 188. See Premium Air, 2007 WL 1345839, at *1. 
 189. See id. at *2.  
 190. See Allcare Complaint, supra note 18, at 10.  
 191. See Premium Air, 2007 WL 1345839, at *2.  
 192. See Snook v. Ford Motor Co., 755 N.E.2d 380, 383–84 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); 
Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 789 N.E.2d 1248, 1253–54 (Ill. 2003). 
 193. See Snook, 755 N.E.2d at 384 (Wolff, P.J., dissenting); Midstate Siding, 789 
N.E.2d at 1257–58 (Kilbride, J., dissenting). Moreover, the Snook court did not actually 
address whether retailers could qualify as CSOs, but rather expressly reserved judgment 
on this point. See Snook, 755 N.E.2d at 383 (majority opinion). 
 194. See Midstate Siding, 789 N.E.2d at 1257–58. 
 195. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2182 (West 2018).  
 196. See Midstate Siding, 789 N.E.2d at 1258. 
 197. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2190 (West 2018) (declaring that any 
violation of the CSA is deemed to be a violation of the UTPCPL).  
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be construed liberally to accomplish this purpose.198 At worst, the CSA’s 
plain language is ambiguous with regard to whether the statute applies to 
healthcare providers that promote third-party medical credit in return for 
facilitated sales,199 but this ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the 
broader definition that better serves the CSA’s remedial aims.200 
Furthermore, the public policy issues posed by healthcare providers 
engaged in third-party patient financing are unique and arguably create a 
more pressing need for regulation than the issues associated with other 
retailers’ financing practices.201 In light of these pressing public policy 
concerns, the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s claims against Allcare 
Dental202 under the CSA should be distinguished from the aforementioned 
out-of-state cases, which involved otherwise similar claims against car 
dealerships,203 a home contractor,204 and an HVAC company.205 In 
contrast, the unique consumer risks associated with unrestrained patient 
financing practices may justify a more liberal interpretation of the CSA to 
better serve its remedial objectives.206 
3. Indirect Payment as Consideration for Healthcare Provider 
Credit Services 
Several jurisdictions with statutes closely analogous to the 
Pennsylvania CSA have accepted an “indirect payment” theory of 
consideration to regulate businesses under their credit services statutes.207 
This theory essentially holds that a business acts as a CSO by assisting its 
customers with obtaining credit in exchange for consideration paid by the 
 
 198. See Commonwealth ex rel. Creamer v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 
812, 815–17 (Pa. 1974). (reasoning that the UTPCPL is remedial legislation that should be 
construed liberally to achieve its remedial aims). 
 199. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2182.  
 200. See Monumental Properties, 329 A.2d at 815–17; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 523 (West 
2019). 
 201. See supra Section II.A.  
 202. See Allcare Complaint, supra note 18, at 21–33.  
 203. See Snook v. Ford Motor Co., 755 N.E.2d 380, 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Cannon 
v. William Chevrolet/Geo, Inc., 794 N.E.2d 843, 849–51 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
 204. See Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 789 N.E.2d 1248, 1250–51 (Ill. 
2003). 
 205. See Premium Air, Inc. v. Luchinski, No. 2006AP2976, 2007 WL 1345839, at *1 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 9, 2007). 
 206. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2190 (West 2018); Commonwealth ex 
rel. Creamer v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 815–17 (Pa. 1974).  
 207. CashCall, Inc. v. Md. Com’r of Fin. Regulation, 139 A.3d 990, 1004–05 (Md. 
2016); Fugate v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 81, 85–86 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); Harper 
v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 706 S.E.2d 63, 71 (W. Va. 2010). Each of these cases involve 
similar fact patterns and legal reasoning; thus, rather than discussing each case in detail, 
Harper will be used as an example to explain the indirect payment theory. 
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customer to the business through the third-party creditor.208 This indirect 
payment theory of consideration would likely be satisfied by healthcare 
providers who promote medical credit products as long as they receive 
some portion of patient funds collected by the creditor. 
To illustrate, in Harper v. Jackson Hewitt,209 plaintiff customers 
brought claims under the West Virginia CSA210 against a tax preparer that 
assisted them in obtaining a tax refund anticipation loan (RAL).211 
Although the plaintiffs did not directly pay the defendant for arranging this 
loan, the plaintiffs did pay documentation fees to the bank that issued their 
RALs as part of their total loan balance.212 The bank would subsequently 
pay these fees forward to the defendant as compensation for facilitating 
the issuance of RALs.213 Notably, the plaintiffs alleged that the bank later 
changed its compensation scheme so that the defendant would only be paid 
periodic lump sums, rather than a fee for each RAL issued.214 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia concluded that, 
according to “the plain and broad sweeping language contained [in] the 
statute,”215 this form of indirect payment constituted “valuable 
consideration,” and so the defendant qualified as a CSO.216 Moreover, the 
court did not condition its holding on whether the compensation scheme 
between the bank and defendant consisted of fees paid for each RAL 
issued, versus periodic lump-sums not associated with any particular 
customer.217 This omission suggests that the indirect payment theory of 
consideration does not require an alleged CSO to receive payments from 
a creditor that can be traced to specific customers. Whenever a CSO is 
paid some amount for referring customers to the creditor, this amount 
presumably reflects a fraction of the creditor’s revenue from each of the 
CSO’s referrals. 
In applying this indirect payment theory to healthcare providers who 
facilitate third-party financing for patients, one must ask whether any form 
of indirect payment to the provider is common in the medical credit 
industry. As it happens, CareCredit has a practice of entering “retailer 
share arrangements” with its partners that “provide for payments to our 
 
 208. See Harper, 706 S.E.2d at 69, 71.  
 209. Harper v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 706 S.E.2d 63 (W. Va. 2010).  
 210. See W. VA. CODE § 46A–6C (West 2018). 
 211. See Harper, 706 S.E.2d at 69.  
 212. See id.  
 213. See id. 
 214. See id. 
 215. W. VA. CODE § 46A–6C–2(a). This West Virginia statute is virtually identical to 
the Pennsylvania CSA in all material respects. Compare id., with 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 2182 (West 2018).  
 216. See Harper, 706 S.E.2d at 71.  
 217. See id. at 69, 71–72.  
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partners if the economic performance of the program exceeds a 
contractually defined threshold.”218 Similarly, CareCredit provides “other 
economic benefits to our partners such as royalties on purchase volume or 
payments for new accounts . . . . All of these arrangements are designed to 
align our interests and provide an additional incentive to our partners to 
promote our credit products.”219 In 2017 alone, CareCredit paid out $9 
million pursuant to these retailer share arrangements.220 
Applying the logic of Harper, payments that healthcare providers 
receive from CareCredit in exchange for referring patients likely constitute 
consideration via indirect payment so as to bring these providers within 
the scope of the CSA.221 Likewise, this assertion probably holds true 
whether a provider receives fees for new accounts that are associated with 
specific patients, or a payment based on CareCredit’s economic 
performance exceeding some contractual benchmark; in either case, the 
provider’s payment is contingent on referring patients to CareCredit. 
The Commonwealth never even alleged the indirect payment theory 
of consideration in its suit against Allcare Dental, but instead relied solely 
on the facilitated sales theory.222 However, if the Commonwealth had 
proven that Allcare did accept such indirect payments from medical 
creditors in exchange for referring patient business, this fact would 
constitute the consideration needed for Allcare to qualify as a CSO. 
B. Evaluation of the Commonwealth’s Claims Against Allcare 
Dental 
As previously discussed, the Pennsylvania Attorney General brought 
claims against Allcare under two separate provisions of the CSA.223 First, 
the Attorney General alleged that Allcare violated Section 2186(c) by 
failing to provide patients with notice of their right to cancel credit service 
contracts within five days of entering them.224 Second, the Attorney 
General alleged that Allcare violated Section 2183(1) by charging patients 
for dental work prior to fully performing its obligations under the 
 
 218. See Synchrony Financial, Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 86 (Feb. 22, 2018). 
CareCredit notes that “[t]he vast majority of our partners are individual and small groups 
of independent healthcare providers.” Id. at 14. 
 219. See id. at 86. 
 220. See id. at 91. CareCredit is actually barred from such practices in New York as a 
result of its 2013 settlement with the New York Attorney General, which provided that 
CareCredit could no longer give “rebates, compensation, or in-kind services to any 
provider in exchange for a provider’s success in generating business for CareCredit.” See 
N.Y. A.G. Press Release, supra note 6. 
 221. See Harper, 706 S.E.2d at 69, 71.  
 222. See Allcare Complaint, supra note 18, at 22, 25, 29, 32. 
 223. See Allcare Complaint, supra note 18, at 21–33. 
 224. See id. at 27–33; 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2186(c) (West 2018). 
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contract.225 The following paragraphs aim to show that, if the 
Commonwealth had brought this case to trial, its likelihood of success—
at least under Section 2183(1)—would have depended upon whether 
Allcare qualified as a CSO under the facilitated sales or indirect payment 
theory of consideration.226 
Under the facilitated sales theory of consideration, a provider 
receives consideration for its credit services through a patient’s use of 
credit to purchase the provider’s healthcare goods or services.227 In 
contrast, under the indirect payment theory, a provider receives 
consideration for its credit services through the creditor’s payment of 
money collected from the patient.228 This distinction is important because, 
under the facilitated sales theory, a patient’s purchase of healthcare goods 
and services becomes part of the credit services contract, whereas under 
the indirect payment theory, it does not. This distinction indicates that, if 
Allcare qualified as a CSO according to the facilitated sales theory alleged 
by the Attorney General,229 the CSA’s requirements would apply to the 
combined transaction for Allcare’s dental work and credit services. 
However, under the indirect payment theory, the CSA’s requirements 
would only apply to Allcare’s credit services. 
With regard to the Attorney General’s claim against Allcare under 
Section 2186(c),230 either theory of consideration would require Allcare to 
provide patients with the Notice of Cancellation required by Section 
2186(c).231 However, a potential difference could arise with regard to a 
patient’s exercise of the right to cancel her credit service contract, as 
Section 2186(c) specifies that the patient will be entitled to a refund of any 
consideration paid under the contract upon cancellation.232 Under the 
facilitated sales theory, if a patient were to exercise this right to cancel her 
credit services contract with Allcare, but already purchased the dental 
goods and services contemplated by the contract, the patient would be 
entitled to a refund for these goods and services. Allcare would likely lose 
money if this happened, as a dental patient cannot simply return a filling 
or crown. As a result, one would expect Allcare to wait for the five-day 
cancellation period to expire before accepting medical credit to provide 
 
 225. See Allcare Complaint, supra note 18, at 21–27; 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 2183(1) (West 2018). 
 226. See supra Section III.A.  
 227. See supra Section III.A.2.  
 228. See supra Section III.A.3. 
 229. See Allcare Complaint, supra note 18, at 22, 25, 29, 32. 
 230. Id. at 27–33.  
 231. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2186(c) (West 2018).  
 232. See id.  
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dental work, which would best advance the regulatory objectives set out 
in this Comment.233 
In contrast, under the indirect payment theory, a patient who decided 
to cancel her credit service contract after purchasing dental work would 
probably not be entitled to a refund from Allcare under Section 2186(c). 
Instead, this patient would only be entitled to a refund or waiver of any 
indirect payment due to Allcare by way of the third-party creditor. The 
amount of this refund would almost certainly be much less than the cost 
of dental work purchased,234 and so the prospect of losing this amount 
would be unlikely to deter Allcare from charging the patient’s credit 
account during the five-day cancellation period. Thus, Section 2186(c) 
would likely fail to establish a five-day “cooling off” period for patient use 
of medical credit where the provider only qualifies as a CSO under the 
indirect payment theory. 
Moreover, the Commonwealth only would have succeeded in its 
claims against Allcare under Section 2183(1)235 if the facilitated sales 
theory of consideration had been accepted. Again, Section 2183(1) would 
prohibit Allcare from accepting any consideration from patients until it has 
fully performed its obligations under the credit service contract.236 If 
Allcare qualifies as a CSO according to the facilitated sales theory, its 
dental work would be part of the performance due to the patient under their 
credit service contract. As such, Allcare would not be permitted under 
Section 2183(1) to charge the patient for this dental work until after it has 
been provided in full. Thus, the Commonwealth could have likely 
succeeded in proving that Allcare violated Section 2183(1) under these 
circumstances. 
In contrast, if Allcare qualifies as a CSO under the indirect payment 
theory of consideration, its only obligation under a credit service contract 
would be to assist the patient in obtaining an extension of credit. As a 
result, Section 2183(1) would not prevent Allcare from charging patients 
for dental work prior to providing them, as the contract for dental goods 
and services would constitute a distinct transaction. In light of this 
distinction, the Commonwealth’s Section 2183(1) claims against 
Allcare237 would have likely failed under the indirect payment theory. 
 
 233. See supra Section II.B.1.  
 234. To illustrate, consider that in 2017, CareCredit paid out only $9 million pursuant 
to retailer share arrangements, compared to the almost $9 billion in medical debt that it was 
owed at the end of the year. See Synchrony Financial, Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 91 
(Feb. 22, 2018). The indirect payments exchanged for a provider’s credit services are likely 
only substantial in the aggregate. 
 235. See Allcare Complaint, supra note 18, at 21–27. 
 236. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2183(1) (West 2018).  
 237. See Allcare Complaint, supra note 18, at 21–27. 
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While the facilitated sales theory of consideration appears more 
favorable to the Commonwealth’s claims against Allcare,238 it has been 
rejected in most of the jurisdictions that have addressed it.239 The indirect 
payment theory seems more likely to succeed, as it has been accepted in 
every jurisdiction that has considered it.240 Even if Allcare only qualified 
as a CSO under the indirect payment theory, the Commonwealth still could 
have likely succeeded in its Section 2186(c) claim, which in turn would 
have opened the door to remedies provided by the UTPCPL.241 
Moreover, with the exception of restitution, these remedies are not 
dependent on the extent of patient harm.242 Indeed, liability in public 
enforcement actions under the UTPCPL does not require proof of any 
actual harm to consumers.243 The civil penalties provided by the UTPCPL 
can be quite steep,244 and an award of penalties against Allcare would send 
a clear message to other providers that their promotion of medical credit 
may give rise to liability under the CSA. Presumably, such penalties will 
lead providers to err on the side of caution when facilitating third-party 
financing for patient care. 
C. Recommendation for Future Enforcement Efforts Under the 
CSA 
While the Allcare litigation was an admirable first step toward 
regulation of this problematic conduct, it had two major shortcomings that 
should be corrected in future enforcement efforts. First, the Pennsylvania 
Attorney General relied solely on the facilitated sales theory of 
consideration in its case against Allcare245—a more legally questionable 
theory than indirect payment.246 Future enforcement under the CSA or 
 
 238. More importantly, the facilitated sales theory is the only one raised by the 
Commonwealth in its complaint. See id. at 22, 25, 29, 32. 
 239. See supra Section III.A.2.  
 240. See supra Section III.A.3.  
 241. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2190(a) (West 2018).  
 242. The availability of restitution would depend on actual financial harm to the patient 
resulting from the provider’s CSA violation. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
201–4.1 (West 2018). Such financial harm will likely be negligible unless the amount that 
a patient pays for dental work is deemed part of her consideration for the credit services 
contract, as under the facilitated sales theory. However, civil penalties and injunctive relief 
could plausibly be awarded regardless of which theory of consideration applies to qualify 
Allcare as a CSO. See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201–4, 201-8 (West 2018). 
 243. Potentially misleading or deceptive business conduct, in itself, is a harm that the 
UTPCPL was designed to prevent. See Commonwealth v. Peoples Benefit Servs., Inc., 923 
A.2d 1230, 1236 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007). 
 244. A court can award up to $1000 per violation in civil penalties under the UTPCPL, 
or up to $3000 for each violation against a consumer who is sixty years of age or older. See 
73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201–8(b). 
 245. See Allcare Complaint, supra note 18, at 22, 25, 29, 32.  
 246. See supra Sections III.A.2–.3.  
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cognate statutes in other states should take care to argue both theories of 
consideration, when applicable, in order to maximize the likelihood of 
success. 
Second, the Allcare complaint only pleads violations of the CSA’s 
notice of cancellation247 and prepayment248 provisions; however, the credit 
service contract requirement249 and broad prohibition of misleading 
conduct250 appear to be the most crucial for ensuring that patients are 
adequately informed when deciding to use medical credit. In order to more 
effectively counteract the behavioral biases that contribute to suboptimal 
patient borrowing decisions,251 future enforcement efforts should 
specifically target providers who omit or misrepresent material facts in 
promoting medical credit. Of particular import are those facts bearing on 
patients’ financial obligations and on relationships between providers and 
creditors.252 Ideally, the credit service contract requirement should serve a 
cautionary function in alerting each patient to the risks of using medical 
credit and to any pecuniary interest of the provider in facilitating the credit 
transaction. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The failure of current law to restrain healthcare providers that 
facilitate patient use of medical credit has allowed these providers to profit 
at the expense of their patients’ financial welfare.253 While specialized 
legislation may provide the best long-term solution to this problem,254 the 
Pennsylvania CSA and analogous statutes in other states provide a means 
to protect patients’ interests without completely eliminating a service that 
many patients may find valuable.255 In essence, the CSA will impose an 
affirmative legal duty on healthcare providers to ensure that patients have 
sufficient time and information to make prudent borrowing decisions.256 
No court has yet approved application of the CSA to healthcare 
providers that facilitate patient use of medical credit. However, this 
practice of promoting medical credit appears to fall within the scope of the 
CSA when the relevant statutory text is interpreted in light of the common 
law of contract consideration.257 Providers that assist patients with using 
 
 247. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2186(c) (West 2018).  
 248. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2183(1) (West 2018).  
 249. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2186(a).  
 250. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2183(4). 
 251. See supra Section II.A.1.  
 252. See id.  
 253. See supra notes 69–80, 218–20 and accompanying text. 
 254. See Hawkins, Doctors as Bankers, supra note 16, at 891–96. 
 255. See supra Section II.B.1. 
 256. See id. 
 257. See supra Section III.A.1. 
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medical credit commonly receive “payment of money or other valuable 
consideration”258 in the form of increased sales revenue or payments from 
third-party creditors.259 Thus, these providers are ostensibly doing 
business as CSOs and should be held to the same standards as other entities 
that facilitate consumer lending. The Allcare litigation may have left this 
issue unresolved, but it still blazed a trail for future enforcement efforts, 
both in Pennsylvania and in other states dealing with the same problem. 
 
 
 258. 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2182 (West 2018). 
 259. See supra Sections III.A.2–.3.  
